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In this paper we show that nancing constraints a¤ect the optimal
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nancing constraint is ine¤ec-
tive. This happens when the rm rationally anticipates that access to
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nancing resources may be rationed in the future. We will
show that with these expectations, the optimal investment policy is to
invest less in any given period, thereby lowering the desired optimal
capital stock in the long run
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1 Introduction
During the last twenty years a large literature on determinants of real invest-
ment have emphasized the role of nancial factors in capital accumulation
by rms. A considerable body of theoretical research has stated that credit
rationing and nancing constraints may be the result of optimizing behavior
of lenders, rather than a consequence of exogenous forces (Hodgman (1960),
Keeton (1979), Stiglitz andWeiss 1981). Further, a number of seminal papers
have provided empirical evidence that real investment depends dramatically
on nancial factors such as internal nance and external debt (Fazzari et al.
1987, 1988). The main conclusion of this literature is that investment spend-
ing can be constrained by credit rationing in the short run. Such rationing
causes the supply curve for funds to bend backwards when demand for loans
exceeds a maximum (endogenous) amount. But, while in these models cap-
ital market imperfections shape the credit supply curve, the demand curve
of capital remains usually una¤ected, so that it is treated and analyzed as if
rms were acting in perfect capital markets (Hubbard, 1998).
A second issue related to the e¤ects of nancing constraints is stressed
by Ja¤ee and Stiglitz (1990). They observe that one of the main limitations
of credit rationing models is the use of comparative statics to analyze the
relationship between investment and nance. This approach, they argue,
makes it di¢ cult to focus on inter-period issues a¤ecting the investment
process. More specically, Ja¤ee and Stiglitz observe that anticipated future
credit rationing can have e¤ects on current aggregate demand, even when
there is no credit rationing at present. Thus the impact of the credit rationing
can not be assessed just by looking at those periods in which there is direct
evidence for its presence(p.874).
However, the more recent debate seems to have acknowledged this sug-
gestion. Indeed, an interesting strand of research has focused on this issue
studying the relationship between future nancing constraints and current in-
vestment decisions. Among these the more remarkable works are Dautumne
and Michel (1985), Milne and Robertson (1996), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
Saltari and Travaglini (2001, 2003, 2006).
More precisely, Kiyotaki and Moore attempts to build on Ja¤ee and
Stiglitzs original intuition, showing that, in the presence of credit rationing,
transitory technological shocks can cause broad uctuations in investment.
In particular, the negative correlation between unexpected shocks and the
price of capital goods can generate a negative cumulative e¤ect on real in-
vestment. Indeed, in their model, shocks, by decreasing the prices of collater-
alized assets, can make the nancing of new investment projects less and less
attractive to an external lender. On the other hand, Saltari and Travaglini
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have shown that nancial constraints need not be currently binding in order
to a¤ect current investment decisions. More precisely, they provide a frame-
work in which rms are neither always constrained nor always unconstrained.
They are concerned with those cases where a rm is free from nancing con-
straints at the current time, but expects to face an upper bound at some later
date. They show that the e¤ects of future nancing constraints are included
in the market value of the rm, and thus are captured by marginal q.
In what follows we try to put together the basic intuitions of these pre-
vious works. Compared to the previous literature, the adding value of this
paper lies in our attempt to provide a new perspective of the investment de-
cisions, scrutinizing the long run impact of (potential) nancing constraints
on the optimal level of the capital stock chosen by the (constrained) rm. We
get two main results. Firstly, we show that in a dynamic stochastic context,
nancing constraints a¤ect rmsbehavior, and, hence, its optimal capital
stock, even when demand for loans is currently below the credit rationing
threshold. This occurs because the rm rationally anticipates the possibil-
ity of future rationing. This forward-looking behavior modies the current
choice of the rm: it knows that a ceiling on its access to nancial resources
imposes an upper limit on capital increasing. Under this expectation we show
that the net present value of the rm, is reduced even when the constraint is
not currently e¤ective. Secondly, we will show that in the presence of nanc-
ing constraint the rm does not limit itself to reducing its investment when
the upper limit is reached. But, what it actually does is to lower its desired
optimal capital stock.
These results are obtained using a simple partial dynamic stochastic equi-
librium model which compares a rationed rms investment decisions with
those taken by a non-rationed rm. No attempt is made to cover all possible
applications of a general equilibrium model.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss a rms in-
vestment policy under the alternative assumptions of a rationed and a non-
rationed credit market. Section 3 compares these solutions. Section 4 draws a
number of conclusions concerning the e¤ects of credit rationing on aggregate
investment.
2 Financial constraints and the value of the
rm
In this section we analyze how nancing constraints a¤ect the rms behavior.
In examining this question, it is useful to compare the behavior of a uncon-
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strained rm, acting in a perfect capital market, with that of a constrained
rm which takes its decisions in the presence of credit constraint.
2.1 Optimal capital stock without nancing constraints
Let us suppose that the rm is risk neutral. Investment decisions are taken
in a perfect capital market, where r is the equilibrium interest rate. Each
rm operates with a large number of projects; it can buy new units of capital,
and resell the old ones.
To simplify, we assume that the rm uses a single capital-input K with
decreasing marginal productivity. The set of production possibilities changes
continuously under a multiplicative shock ; whose dynamics are given by
dt = tdz (1)
where the shock  is a geometric Brownian motion without drift, and dz is a
Wiener process with E (dz) = 0 and E (dz)2 = dt: The production function
is
tf (Kt) = tK

t ; with 0 <  < 1 (2)
The unconstrained rm chooses its optimal capital so as to maximize the
present discounted value V (t; Kt) of the expected cash ows:
V (t; Kt) = maxfIsg
Et
Z 1
t
e r(s t) [sf (Ks)  Is] ds

(3)
where dK = Isds is the investment ow, and the depreciation rate is equal
to zero. The functional (3) can be rewritten using the Bellman equation:
rVtdt = maxfIg
f[tf (Kt)  It] dt+ Et (dV )g (4)
Under the assumption of a perfect credit market the solution of (4) is1
V NR (t; Kt) =
f (Kt )
r
(5)
This means that the value of the unrationed rm (NR) is equal to the present
discounted value of expected cash ow corresponding to the desired capital
stockKt . Finally, combining the expression (5) with the rst order condition
for prot maximization ( V NRK = 1) we obtain
f
0
(Kt )
r
= 1; that is:
NR (Kt) =
r
f 0 (Kt)
=
r

(Kt)
1  (6)
1See the Appendix for the derivation of this result.
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This last condition is particularly revealing because it describes the relation-
ship between the value of the shock  and the desired capital stock corre-
sponding to : Graphically, this relation is the upward-sloping curve NR (see
gure 1). Under the assumption of diminishing returns a rm which wishes
to raise its capital stock and which therefore needs to increase its investment
also requires a higher . In other words, given the starting level Kt; if the
shock is higher than the one on the NR curve; the marginal value of the rm
is V NRK > 1; the optimal policy is therefore to increase the capital stock so
as to satisfy the condition V NRK = 1. Hence, if we start from a point on the
NR curve; it is obvious that the higher the shock the higher is the increment
in the desired capital stock. For the same reason below the NR curve where
V NRK < 1; the rm nds it optimal to disinvest.
Using this argument we reach a rst conclusion: if a rm acts without
nancial constraints the sole determinants of its investment decisions are the
changing value of the shock  and the corresponding value of its marginal
productivity f 0 (Kt). In any period uctuations in  can change the optimal
capital stock but the size of past or future expected shocks has no e¤ect on
current investment decisions.
2.2 Optimal capital stock with nancing constraints
The previous result shows that in a perfect credit market investment decisions
in any given period are independent with respect to the size of the shock  in
other periods. Does this property change in the presence of credit rationing?
To analyze this problem, assume that the rm cannot nance new invest-
ment projects using internal nance or by issuing new shares; it can, however,
request new funds from external lenders. Assume that the maximum amount
of credit the rm can obtain is equal to the proportion 0 < m < 1 of the start-
ing endowment Kt; owned by the rm. It follows that the maximum capital
stock that a rm can obtain in the next period is equivalent to Kt (1 +m) :2
In this model, the coe¢ cient m is a parameter which is independent from
the capital stock. Though this last assumption might appear too restrictive
with respect to some models of credit rationing, it is rich enough to discuss
the consequences of imperfect capital markets on the investment demand.3
2There are several denition of credit rationing. In this context we refer to type 1 credit
rationing:: the credit contract denes the maximum amount of loan available at the going
interest rate.
3We do not attempt to derive this constraint endogenously. However, Hart and Moore
(1994), and Kyotaki and Moore (1997) give an argument to show the nature of this con-
tract: creditors know in advance the liquidation value of assets in place utilized as collat-
eral. So they take care never to allow the loan to exceed the value of the collateralized
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To evaluate how credit constraints alter the value of the rm, let us
consider how investment policy changes in the presence of a credit ceiling.
Contrary to the previous framework where an individual rms ow of invest-
ment depends exclusively on the value of the shock, in the present context
there is an upper limit to investment at It = mKt. A rm observes  and
knows that, whatever its value, new investment cannot exceed the upper
limit xed by the loan constraint. As a result the current value of the rm is
reduced by the potential prots which it will never gain because of the credit
ceiling. In other words, the credit barrier reduces the rms prot potential
and its current value. The main consequence of this expectation is a change
in the curve describing the dynamic, equilibrium relationship between shocks
and desired changes in capital stock; at the current time the rm is already
anticipating future credit rationing.
To calculate the value of the rationed rm, assume that Kt (1 +m) is
the maximum capital stock the rm can hold when the shock  reaches a
particular trigger value, that is the constraint is binding. In this setting the
general solution of the problem
rVtdt = maxfItg
Et f[tf (Kt)  It] dt+ Et (dV )g (7)
under the credit constraint Is  Ksm for any s  t; with 0 < m < 1; is
V RZ (Kt; t) = A (Kt) 
n1
t +B (Kt) 
n2
t +
tf [Kt]
r
(8)
where RZ refers to the rationed rm and n1 > 1 e n2 < 0 are the roots of the
characteristic equation.4 A (Kt) and B (Kt) are constants of integration
whose value depends on current assets. The last term on the right is the
fundamental value. As usual it identies the current value of future prots
generated by the capital in place. If, as in the previous section, the ow of
investment can change freely, the optimal solution for the rm is Kt ; and
the constants A(Kt) and B(Kt) must be equal to zero in order to satisfy the
condition (5).
But if investment reaches the upper barrier at Ktm; we have to consider
the value of the rm for small values of : Starting from such a value, it is
unlikely that the shock  will climb the barrier at any time in the immediate
future; it is also unlikely, therefore, that the rm will invest at any time in
the reasonable future. In this case the value of the rm is given by its current
capital goods Kt:
4The value of the two roots is respectively n1 = 12 +
q
1
4 + 2
r
2 > 1 and n2 =
1
2  q
1
4 + 2
r
2 < 0 .
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assets that is V RZ (Kt; t) =
f [Kt]
r
: But as  tends to zero the expression
n2t tends to rise because n2 < 0: This implies that for small values of  the
solution B (Kt) 
n2
t increases, implying an increase in the value of the rm
and in investment, whereas the economic problem implies zero value and zero
investment. To avoid this di¢ cult we set B(Kt) = 0; in the value equation
(8) rewriting the equation as:
V RZt = A (Kt) 
n
t +
tf (Kt)
r
(9)
where to simplify we write n for n1: The remaining constantis determined
by the behavior of the rm at the barrier It = Ktm: Since maximization
requires V RZK = 1; the optimal constrained policy of the rm must satisfy the
condition
V RZK = A
0
(Kt(1 +m)) 
n
t +
tf
0
(Kt (1 +m))
r
= 1 (10)
This expression alone is not su¢ cient to determine both A0 (Kt) and the
trigger value of : To solve equation (9), we have to ensure that under an
e¤ective credit constraint, innitesimal changes of  do not induce the rm
to modify its decisions; reducing investment. At the barrier we should thus
have VK = 0; that is
VK = A
0 (Kt(1 +m))n
(n 1)
t +
f
0
(Kt (1 +m))
r
= 0
Putting together these two boundary conditions and remembering that f (K) =
K; we obtain
A0 (Kt(1 +m)) =  (n  1)
n 1
(nr)n
n (Kt (1 +m))
n( 1) (11a)
 (Kt(1 +m)) =
n
n  1
r

(Kt (1 +m))
1  (11b)
The expression (11a) is particularly eloquent. Since A0 (Kt(1 +m)) is nega-
tive, the solution A
0
(Kt(1 +m)) 
n associated with the positive root can be
interpreted as the (implicit) marginal cost the rm su¤ers for not investing
over the credit threshold Ktm: In other words, A
0
(Kt(1 +m)) 
n represents
the marginal prot lost by the rm because of credit rationing. Intuition
suggests that if Kt (1 +m) is the maximum capital stock available starting
from Kt, the rm is being forced to give up the marginal prots which would
derive from the potential expansion of capacity beyond Ktm. So, by using
the solution for A0 (Kt(1 +m)) over the interval [Kt (1 +m) ;1); we obtain
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the market value of any additional investments that the rm cannot realize
because of the credit constraint
A(Kt (1 +m)) =
Z 1
Kt(1+m)
  [A0 (k)] dk = (n  1)
n 1
(nr)n
n
(Kt (1 +m))
n( 1)+1
n (  1) + 1
The constant A(Kt (1 +m)) is negative.5 Substituting in (9) the economic
interpretation is evident: since the rm anticipates the possibility of future
constraints, potential credit rationing reduces the present value of expected
prot and, as a consequence, the value of the rm.
3 Constraints and investment
The condition (11b) describes the relationship between changes in  and uc-
tuations in desired capital stock under credit rationing. Under this condition,
and unlike the situation described by equation (5), we have a multiplicative
factor n
n 1 : Given that n > 1; this factor is greater than one. The main
consequence is that for the constrained rm the trigger value for the shock
must exceed the critical threshold for the unconstrained rm to hold the
same capital stock. In short, for identical shocks the constrained rm seeks
a smaller capital stock. In gure 1 this proposition is illustrated by the RZ
boundary curve. The boundary curve describes the trigger value of the shock
 corresponding to the maximum investment Ktm, or, equivalently, to the
optimal capital Kt (1 +m). The equation of the RZ curve is given by the
condition (11b)
RZ (Kt(1 +m)) =
n
n  1
r

(Kt (1 +m))
1 
This relationship implies that the RZ curve must be traced to the left of the
NR curve.
This equation has some meaningful properties. The position of the RZ
curve depends on the value of the positive root n, which is a function of
r and 2: When the interest rate r rises the value of n rises as well, and
correspondingly the critical value RZ is reduced. This means that the credit
5Calculating the integral, we get
  (n  1)
n 1
(nr)
n 
n k
n( 1)+1
n (  1) + 1

1
Kt(1+m)
For convergence of the integral,  must be su¢ ciently less than one so that n (  1)+1 <
0:
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r   KRZ KNR
0.04 0.15 0.5 76 100
0.06 0.15 0.5 80 100
0.04 0.30 0.5 59 100
Table 1: Comparing capital stocks for some values of r,  and .
constraint loosens. Intuitively, the negative correlation between RZ and r
is determined by the fact that an higher interest rate reduces the desired
capital stock, and consequently decreases the probability to be rationed in
the future. On the other hand, when the variance 2 rises the value of the
root n reduces, and, hence, the trigger value RZ rises. This is because the
prot function is a convex function of the shock : But, since the rm is
credit constrained the actual investment can never exceed Ktm; and the rm
perceives as an exacerbation of the credit constraint the increase of 2.
From (6) and from (11b) we can directly calculate desired capital stocks
on the two alternative curves
KNR =

r

1
NR
 1
 1
and
KRZ  Kt (1 +m) =

r

n
n  1
1
RZ
 1
 1
For the same level of shock RZ = NR; combining the last two equations
gives
KRZ = KNR

n
n  1
 1
 1
This condition explains the previous proposition. Given that
 
n
n 1
 1
 1 < 1,
for the same shock, the RZ rm seeks a smaller capital stock than the NR
rm.
Note that the root n a¤ects dramatically both the desired capital stock
and the solution A (Kt(1 +m)) 
n
t . The following table shows the level of
desired capital stock for the two alternative cases of constrained and uncon-
strained rm.
For plausible values of the parameters, i.e. r = 4%;  = 15% and  = 0:5;
if 100 is the capital stock of the NR rm, the desired capital of the RZ rm
is much smaller and equal to KNR
 
n
n 1
 1
 1 = 100  (76%) = 76.
Further, this example points out an aspect strongly debated in the invest-
ment theory: the relationship between uncertainty and demand for capital.
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The previous data illustrate that for the NR rm the relationship between
 and KRZ is negative, that is an increase in uncertainty reduces the desired
capital stock. Obviously, in our setting this e¤ect is negative. This is because
there is no positive e¤ect due to factors technological substitutability, since
the rm acts with only a single input (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
3.1 More on constraints and optimal capital stock
So far we have considered how credit rationing acts on the RZ rms desired
capital stock. To push our analysis a bit further, let us see now what happens
to investment policy. To discuss this point, a third curve, labelled CM; is
drawn in gure 1. This line describes, for any starting level of Kt, the trigger
value of RZ that induces the rm to make the new maximum investment
It = Ktm. Its equation is obtained from the condition (11b)
CM (Kt) =
n
n  1
r

(Kt (1 +m))
1 
The CM line is not a barrier control, but it is useful to describe the evolution
of the investment. The horizontal distance between CM and RZ measures
the maximum investmentKtm: In turn, any point included in the area among
the two curves identies the value of the shock which causes an investment
smaller than the credit constraint.
Taking into consideration these three curves, it is now possible to describe
the RZ rms investment policy.
When V RZK > 1; the marginal value of the RZ rm is higher than the
user cost of the new investment. Thus the rm invests, but the value of the
investment is no higher than the level xed by the credit constraint.
For instance, if the initial capital is Kt and the shock is 0; the NR
rm nds it optimal to invest until K (see gure 1). The credit constraint
prevents the RZ rm from obtaining this capital stock: maximum investment
must be no higher than Ktm; as a result the di¤erence K   Kt (1 +m)
gives a measure of credit rationing. In other words, when the shock reaches
the trigger value CM along the curve CM; the supply of lending becomes
inelastic, ensuring that the investment will be no higher than Ktm: Given
that the investment is free to range only over the area between the CM and
the RZ curves and that it cannot climb to the upper ceiling, we see that the
CM curve is a reecting barrier for the stochastic process . At the trigger
value CM the rm invests to obtain Kt (1 +m) ; moving rightward along
the RZ curve. This behavior is exemplied in the gure 1, where the shock
CM = 0 causes an investment equal to Ktm. It is clear that for  > 0
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θ0
θ1
θ2
θ3
θ
CM
RZ
NR
Kt Kt(1+m) Kt*
Figure 1: Investment under nancial constraints
investment cannot increase further. There is, in other words a proportional
rise in credit rationing.
A meaningful result is obtained when the value of the shock lies between
the CM and RZ curves : With reference to gure 1, this occurs when 0 <
1 < 2. Above the RZ curve V RZK > 1: Here investment is positive but
less than Ktm: the rm invests but for an amount just su¢ cient to return
to the RZ curve . In this case, although the constraint is slack, we cannot
derive the optimal capital stock from the NR curve : the forward-looking
rm anticipates the possibility of future rationing even if the constraint is
not e¤ective at the current time. In technical terms the RZ rm nds it
optimal to satisfy the marginal condition V RZK = 1 even when the credit
constraint is not e¤ective. If investment was higher than necessary to satisfy
the condition (11b), we would obtain (see gure 1) a point below the RZ
curve where, given the credit constraint, V RZK < 1 . At this point, however,
the rm will optimize its performance by reducing its capital stock. This
result conforms to the intuition stated above: namely that the constraint
on credit lead to a reduction in overall demand for capital. The size of the
correction due to the credit ceiling is given by A (Kt(1 +m)) 
n
t .
According to this result, note that if a monetary policy can improve the
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credit market reducing the coe¢ cient m, the multiplier n
n 1 does not change.
As a consequence, the RZ curve remains to the left of the NR curve.
All this leads to a remarkable result when the shock  is smaller that the
shock required to satisfy the RZ curve. This is the case for 3: Here the rm
optimizes its performance by reducing its current assets so as to return to the
curve at the point where V RZK = 1. The main implication of this investment
decision is to enforce the credit constraint. Since the volume of loans o¤ered
by the lender is proportional to capital stock, the smaller the current stock
the smaller will be the available credit. In this way the maximizing behavior
of the RZ rm can initiate a vicious circle. During a phase of economic
recession the rm reduces its capital endowment. This hurts the rm in the
next period because it owns less collateralizable assets. In the presence of
credit rationing this reduces the demand for capital. From this point of view,
credit rationing is caused not only by optimal decisions on the supply side (
Hodgman, (1960)), but also by forward-looking expectations on the demand
side.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied rms behavior under nancing constraints. In
our model credit rationing a¤ects investment decisions in all periods, even
when the constraint is not directly e¤ective. When investment decisions
are constrained by credit rationing the limited nancial resources act as an
upper bound on investment. In this context, the constraint produces an
overall decrease in the net present value of the rm capturing the discounted
expected loss of investment and prots. As a result, the constrained rm is
always worth less than its fundamental value. In additon, this result implies
that the capital demand of a constrained rm is always smaller than the
capital demand of the identical unconstrained rm.
The novel outcome of this model lies in the argument that nancing
constraints a¤ects not only the supply curve of funds, but also the demand
curve of capital. Furthermore, if temporary productivity shocks reduce the
net worth of current capital stock in some periods, the rm can rationally
desire to lessen its capital stock (used as collateral), thereby reinforcing the
negative e¤ects of the constraints. When this happens, the rm initiates a
vicious circle.
Aizeman and Marion (1999), studying the correlation between real invest-
ment and nancial constraints, have claimed that credit rationing introduces
a non-linearity in the supply curve, hampering the expansion of investment
in good times, without mitigating the drop in the bad times. In their paper,
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however, the demand for capital is una¤ected by credit rationing. Our re-
sults cast doubt on that conclusion. As we have shown, the forward-looking
rm anticipates the possibility of future rationing, even in periods when the
constraint is not directly e¤ective. As a result the probability of future ra-
tioning may exert negative e¤ects on capital demand in any period, thereby
altering the overall pattern of investment.
The partial equilibrium model employed in this paper is technically sim-
ple. Nonetheless, this framework could be extended to develop the dynamic
perspective which characterizes the model. Hubbard (1998) has suggested
the need for a comprehensive framework within which to study the incre-
mental e¤ects of nancing constraints and irreversible capital on investment
decisions. Obviously, such a challenge can only be met is we assume that the
capital is at least partially reversible, so that capital goods can be used as
collateralized assets in the loan contract.
Finally, many authors have stressed that the investment models à la Jor-
genson, as well as models with irreversibility, represent observed investment
dynamics in an unsatisfactory way. Such dynamics, it is argued, are more
stable that those suggested by theoretical models (Bertola and Caballero
(1994). The stylized facts seem to strengthen the argument that uctuat-
ing interest rates do not provide a satisfactory explanation for inter-period
investment proles. These observations suggest that sluggishness in aggre-
gate investment can be a consequence of quantitative constraints rather than
prices and that poor aggregate investment can be the result of heterogeneous
investment decisions penalized by credit constraints.
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5 Appendix
In this appendix we derive the solution to the maximization problem of the
unconstrained rm.
Using Itos lemma and the stochastic process (1), we obtain an expression
for the expected capital gain
Et (dV ) = VKdK +
1
2
22tVdt
Substituting this expression into the Bellman equation (4)
rVtdt = maxfIg
f[tf (Kt)  It] dt+ Et (dV )g
we can write
rVt = maxfIg

tf (Kt)  It + VKIt + 1
2
22tV

The rst order condition is
VK = 1 (12)
Substituting for VK in the previous equation we have the following di¤erential
equation
rVt = tf (Kt) +
1
2
22tV (13)
whose characteristic equation is
r =
1
2
2n (n  1)
The general solution of (13) is
V (Kt; t) = A (Kt) 
n1
t +B (Kt) 
n2
t +
tf (Kt)
r
Ruling out speculative bubbles, i.e. setting to zero the two constants A (Kt)
and B (Kt) ; we get
V (t; Kt) =
tf (K

t )
r
which is equation (5). This is what we call in the main text the fundamental
value, that is the present discounted value of expected cash ow correspond-
ing to the desired capital stock.
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